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DETERMINANTS OF TECHNOLOGY








We estimate the role of peer effects in technology adoption using data from a randomized distribution
of menstrual cups in Nepal. Using individual randomization, we estimate causal effects of peer
exposure on adoption. We find strong evidence of peer effects: two months after distribution, one
additional friend with access to the menstrual cup increases usage by 18.6 percentage points. Using
the fact that we observe both trial and usage of the product over time, we examine the mechanisms
that drive peer effects. We show evidence that peers impact learning how to use the technology, but
find less evidence that peers impact an individual desire to use the menstrual cup. (JEL: J13, O33,
O12)
1. Introduction
Understanding the influence of an individual’s peers—friends, acquaintances,
neighbors, classmates—on behavior has been of interest to economists in a wide
variety of fields, including education (e.g. Sacerdote 2000; Hoxby 2000; Zimmerman
2002; Angrist and Lang 2002; Figlio 2003), labor (e.g. Kling, Liebman and Katz 2007;
Munshi 2003), development (e.g. Foster and Rosenzweig 1995; Miguel and Kremer
2004) and industrial organization (e.g., Mas and Moretti 2009; Mobius, Niehaus,
and Rosenblat 2005). Of particular interest has been the role of peers in technology
adoption, either by firms or individuals. Within the field of development, peer effects
may have normative implications: new technologies frequently have the potential to
dramatically improve quality of life, but adoption is often sub-optimally slow (see,
among others, Foster and Rosenzweig 1995; Conley and Udry 2010; Duflo, Kremer,
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and Robinson 2008; Miguel and Kremer 2004; Munshi 2003; Bandiera and Rasul
2006; Foster and Rosenzweig 2010).
Estimating the role of peers or social interactions in driving technology adoption
is made difficult by the problem of correlated unobservables (Manski 1993). When the
econometrician observes two friends both adopting a new technology, it is difficult to
separate whether they learn from each other or if fast-adopter individuals simply have
fast-adopter friends. Economists have focused on a variety of econometric techniques
to disentangle peer effects from correlated unobservables (Foster and Rosenzweig
1995; Conley and Udry 2010; Munshi 2003; Figlio 2003; Bandiera and Rasul 2006)
including, more recently, explicit randomization (Sacerdote 2000; Kremer and Levy
2008; Mobius, Rao and Rosenblat 2007; Duflo and Saez 2003; Godlonton and Thornton
2012; Miguel and Kremer 2004; Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson 2008; Miguel and
Kremer 2007).
The results on peer effects in technology adoption are somewhat mixed. Much of
the literature (e.g. Foster and Rosenzweig 1995; Conley and Udry 2010) finds peer
exposure has a positive impact on technology adoption. However, recent, randomized,
work has found either negative peer effects (Miguel and Kremer 2007) or no effects
(Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson 2008). One possible way to reconcile these results
is to examine what mechanisms drive the effects. There are at least three possible
mechanisms: individuals prefer to behave like their friends, individuals learn about
the benefits of the technology from their friends, and individuals learn about how to
use a new technology from their friends. The third mechanism, in particular, is likely
to operate primarily in cases where the technology is difficult to use, which could be
useful in explaining differences across technologies in the existing literature. However,
existing work has typically not been able to separate these mechanisms (Duflo and
Saez 2003; Munshi and Myaux 2006).1
In this paper we use data from a randomized evaluation of menstrual cup
distribution in Nepal to (1) estimate the role of peer influence in adoption of a new
technology and (2) provide initial evidence on what mechanisms drive the peer effects
we observe. A menstrual cup is a small, silicone, bell-shaped device which is used
internally during menstruation; it is completely unfamiliar to our subjects at the start
of the study and is unavailable for purchase in Nepal. We enrolled a sample of 198
adolescent girls and their mothers in four schools in Chitwan, Nepal and randomized
(at the individual level) allocation of menstrual cups to half of the sample. Subjects
were followed for approximately 18 months and detailed data were collected on cup
adoption over this time. Crucially for our analysis of mechanisms, we collected data
in each month on whether the girl tried the cup and whether she used it successfully.
1. The few cases, primarily in sociology and demography, in which efforts have been made to distinguish
between these mechanisms tend to be plagued by the same type of identification problems inherent in all
non-experimental estimates of peer effects (Kohler, Behrman, and Watkins 2001). A partial exception is
Miguel and Kremer (2007) who find negative peer effects, which effectively rules out two of the three
explanations above (wanting to behave like friends and learning from friends); this is discussed in more
detail in what follows.
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In general, adoption of the menstrual cup is quite high, with roughly 60% of girls
using the cup by the end of the study. This may be surprising, given that the technology
was new (unavailable prior to the study), and the fact that the observed benefits of
the cup are fairly limited. As we find elsewhere (Oster and Thornton 2011) school
attendance is not increased by having access to the cup, and the primary observed
impact is a decrease of about 20 minutes per day in laundry time during menstruation.
However, reports from the girls in the sample indicate there were significant gains in
mobility and comfort from using the cup rather than the traditional cloths, suggesting
they valued the product highly even if this valuation is difficult to see in observed
behaviors.
We begin by using our data to estimate the influence of peers on individual usage
of the menstrual cup. The variation we use to estimate the effect of peers on individual
use is generated by the randomization: at the baseline survey, girls were asked to list
their closest friends who were also part of the study, allowing us to identify friendships.
Access to the cup was randomized at the individual level. As a result, although the
number of total friends is endogenous, the share of friends who are in the treatment
group is random. This methodology is similar to the methodology used by Miguel and
Kremer (2007) to estimate peer effects in adoption of deworming drugs; in both cases,
the analysis focuses on the treatment group, but the existence of the control group is
what generates the random variation.2
We find evidence of large positive peer effects. Two months into the study, one
additional treatment friend increases cup usage by 18.6 percentage points. This effect
dissipates over time: by six months after cup distribution, the effect of friend ownership
on usage is no longer significant. This suggests the primary effect of peers is to increase
speed of adoption.
After establishing that there are positive peer effects driving adoption, we examine
the mechanisms through which this occurs. As noted above, there are at least three
possible mechanisms through which peers could affect adoption: imitation, learning
about cup value and learning how to use. We collapse these three mechanisms into
two broader categories: peers influencing individual’s wanting to use (reflecting either
imitation or learning about product value) and peers influencing individual’s success
at usage (reflecting learning how to use).
Without additional assumptions, our study data does not allow us to separate these
effects empirically. However, after introducing additional structure we use our trial
and usage data to evaluate mechanisms. We present a simple two-stage model of the
adoption process in which friends can affect both whether their peers want to use
the cup and also whether they will be successful at using it. Intuitively, we draw a
parallel between attempting to use and wanting to use, and successful use conditional
on attempting and success at usage. We use the structure of the model to make this
2. It is also the case that in both of these studies the product was available to all individuals for free and
the variation in adoption comes from either desire to adopt or ability to use. One difference is that in our
setting the product is completely unfamiliar to individuals, which may not be true of the deworming drugs.
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link explicit. Because this analysis relies in part on some structural assumptions we
interpret these results with more caution.
Our results suggest that friends significantly affect success at usage. In early
months, having one additional treatment friend-month of exposure to the cup increases
the probability of successful usage by three percentage points (on a baseline probability
of around 58%). In contrast, we find less evidence that peer exposure impacts wanting
to use the new technology. Although girls with more treatment friends are more likely
to try the technology, this appears to be due to the fact that they are more likely to be
successful at using it, which makes trial more appealing.
The technology in this paper shares features with many other technologies which
may be of more intrinsic interest but may be more difficult to study (e.g. fertilizer or
vaccines). In particular, the findings here may have strong applicability to the important
case of contraceptive technologies, which have many similar features (used primarily
by young women, relatively private, related to reproduction). Our results suggest that
peer influences might be quite important in encouraging contraceptive take-up.
Further, although the basic design used here is similar to what is used elsewhere (i.e.
Miguel and Kremer 2007) our particular experiment has several unique and important
features. Because menstruation occurs frequently we are able to observe the evolution
of peer effects and learn about the effect of peers on the speed of adoption. In addition,
the fact that we observe both trial and usage of the menstrual cup allow us to make
progress on understanding some of the mechanisms behind why peers matter.
Our findings suggest that with an easy to use product there may be only limited
scope for peer-based targeting, because the primary impact of peers on adoption may
not be relevant. In contrast, with a difficult to use product, peer-based targeting could
have large effects on the speed of adoption. Consistent with this, positive peer effects
are more often found in cases where the product is difficult to use (i.e. adoption of
high yield varieties of seeds), and not in cases where the product is easy to use (i.e.
adoption of deworming drugs).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the setting, the
experimental design, the menstrual cup, and the data that we will be using. Section 3
presents our estimates of the role of peer exposure in driving adoption. Section 4
analyzes the mechanisms that drive these effects. Section 5 concludes.
2. Experimental Design, Survey, and Data
The data and results in this paper come from a randomized evaluation of menstrual cups
in Chitwan, a district in Southwestern Nepal. Women and girls in this area, as in much
of the rest of Nepal, traditionally use cloths during menstruation to soak menstrual
blood. These cloths can be unsanitary if not washed carefully, and are reported to be
inconvenient and uncomfortable. Sanitary pads are typically familiar to people, but not
widely available or used, and the use of tampons is extremely rare. In the evaluation,
menstrual cups were distributed randomly to half of the participants, as an alternative
to cloths, and usage was observed over time.
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TABLE 1. Summary statistics.
Panel A: Number of participants
Girls Mothers Female relative
School 1 54 41 13
School 2 48 35 13
School 3 48 41 7
School 4 48 40 7
Panel B: Summary statistics
Mean Standard deviation No. of observations
Age 14.2 1.24 197
Seventh grade (0/1) 0.53 0.50 198
Test score last year −0.08 1.18 198
Father Hindu 0.52 0.50 198
Father Tharu or Tibetan 0.42 0.49 198
Income category 2.55 1.55 190
Mother’s yrs educ. 2.69 3.90 190
Father’s yrs educ. 5.61 4.71 190
Menses at baseline (0/1) 0.87 0.33 197
Work for pay 0.22 0.41 198
Days/week worked (if >0) 2.51 1.93 43
Time to wash cloths 30.9 32.2 197
Number of friends 3.78 1.35 198
Share of friends treatment 0.51 0.27 196
Notes: All girls were in either seventh or eighth grade. Age at menses is reported only for girls who have their
menses at baseline. Total number of friends includes all friends the individual lists, plus any people who list her
as a friend. The omitted ethnicity category is Newari. Income categories range from 1 to 6, and correspond to
yearly incomes of: Less than 25k Rs, 25k–50k, 50k–75k, 75k–100k, 100k–150k, more than 150k.
2.1. Participants and Survey Timeline
Four schools in and around Bharatpur City in Chitwan District, Nepal were chosen
in November of 2006 to participate in the study; of these, two were urban schools
and two were peri-urban. Based on the school roster of girls who were enrolled at
the start of the school year, 60 seventh-grade and eighth-grade girls from each school
were invited, with their mothers, to participate in the study (this represented most of
the seventh and eighth graders). Participation was contingent on attendance at the first
study meeting. The girls were told that they would receive a gift (pens and stickers)
at the meeting, and their mothers received 100 Nepali Rupees (about US$1.45). If a
mother was not available, girls were told they could bring an older female relative
or guardian to the meeting. Column 1 of Panel A of Table 1 shows the total number
of girl participants in each school; 11%–20% of the invited students in each school
were not able to attend the meeting and therefore did not participate in the study.
Columns 2 and 3 in Panel A show the composition of the older female participants:
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79% of girls participated with their mothers, and 21% with a female relative/
guardian.3
At the initial study meeting, after informed consent was obtained, a baseline
survey was administered to the girls and their mothers. This survey included
basic demographic information, as well as questions about school performance and
menstruation. At the end of this initial meeting, girls were given identification numbers
and a public lottery was held in which 25 identification numbers were drawn out of a
bag. Girls whose numbers were drawn were assigned to the treatment group with their
mother or guardian (we did not separately randomize mothers). Those in the treatment
group were asked to remain at the meeting and each was given a menstrual cup. A nurse
gave detailed instructions to those in the treatment group on the use of the menstrual
cup.4 Control girls were informed before they left that they would receive the cup at
the end of the study.
After the initial meeting, girls were followed for approximately fifteen months
(through January 2008). During this time, there was an in-school nurse visit
approximately once per month, at which time the treatment girls were asked about
their experiences with the menstrual cup. The number of girls interviewed at each
visit varied; although there was close to complete coverage in the first few months, on
average 81% of treatment girls were available at each visit in later months. There is no
systematic attrition across groups.
In February 2008 a second meeting was held in each school. At this meeting, a
follow-up survey, similar to the baseline survey, was administered. The control girls
and their mothers were given the menstrual cup. Ninety-two percent of the girls in the
study attended the follow-up meeting. Of the 15 girls not able to attend the meeting all
but one were interviewed by enumerators at a later date (these included seven treatment
and seven control girls).
2.2. Sanitary Technology
The sanitary technology we use is a menstrual cup, specifically the Mooncup brand
cup, shown in Figure 1 (similar cups are sold under the names Keeper and DivaCup).5
This product is a small, silicone, bell-shaped cup which is inserted in the vagina to
collect menstrual blood. For most women the cup has to be emptied approximately
every twelve hours during menstruation. Between uses, the cup is washed with soap
and water and stored in a cloth bag. With proper care, the cup is reusable for up to a
decade.6
3. In one case, in school 4, a girl was permitted to participate without her mother, with a note.
4. One of the mother–daughter pairs randomized to the treatment group decided not to accept the
menstrual cup. We keep this girl in the sample, which means we estimate an intent-to-treat effect. This girl
and her mother were each interviewed at the follow-up survey.
5. For more information, see http://www.mooncup.co.uk/.
6. There is no risk of Toxic Shock Syndrome, and generally no risk of complications from the cup.
This menstrual cup has been FDA approved in the United States. Like any internal vaginal device (e.g.
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FIGURE 1. MoonCup photo.
In the area of Nepal where our experiment takes place, the primary protection
women use during their period is menstrual cloths (tampons are not available and
pads are expensive and often difficult to obtain). These cloths are placed inside a
woman’s underwear to soak up menstrual blood. The cloths are washed and reused.
The menstrual cup may be a significant improvement over this cloth technology for
several reasons. First, if correctly inserted, women should not notice the presence of
the menstrual cup and it should not affect mobility. Anecdotal evidence from Nepali
women to whom we gave the cup as a pilot suggested that increased mobility was
a major advantage—women said that they were able to bicycle and that they even
forgot they were having their period. Second, cleaning the menstrual cup for reuse is
significantly easier than cleaning the menstrual cloths. The cup is washed with soap
and water, which takes only a minute or two; the cloths must be boiled and laundered,
typically by hand. Data from our baseline survey indicates this takes an average of
30 minutes per month; time diary reports from the girls indicated they spent about
23 extra minutes per day during their menstruation. All of these factors—increased
mobility, ease of use, and no need to wash cloths—were mentioned by girls at the
follow-up survey as advantages of the cup.7
tampons), the menstrual cup can cause rupture of the hymen. Girls in our setting were carefully told about
this during the initial meeting, but this issue is not as significant in Nepal as it would be in a place like
Saudi Arabia. It is possible some girls did not use for this reason, but seems unlikely this is a major factor
limiting adoption (no girls mentioned this as an issue).
7. In a second paper using the data from this study (Oster and Thornton 2011) we evaluate whether
these mobility benefits translate into increases in school enrollment; we find they do not and, further,
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We argue that the menstrual cup is well suited for studying determinants of
technology adoption. First, the technology is not available for purchase in Nepal,
meaning we do not have to contend with the concern that some girls initially know
more about the technology than others do. Second, although the cup is comfortable to
use for most women, it often takes time for people to learn how to insert and remove
it comfortably. The cup must be flattened and folded in half in order to insert it into
the vagina and it takes some practice to position it correctly to prevent leakage. Given
that insertable reproductive devices are rare in Nepal, and that our main respondents
were young adolescent girls who were just becoming familiar with their reproductive
health, using this technology was likely to take some practice. This suggests that there
is scope for understanding the learning component of technology adoption.
2.3. Data
This paper uses three primary elements of the data from the menstrual cup experiment:
demographic and cup value data, data on cup adoption, and data on friendships.
Demographics and Cup Value. From the baseline survey we make use of a number
of control variables on demographics which are summarized in Panel B of Table 1.
The average age is 14, and girls are evenly divided between the seventh and eighth
grades, by construction. 52% of the girls are of Hindu ethnicity and 42% percent are
Tibetan or Tharu; the remaining category is Newari. 87% of girls had their period at the
baseline survey. Mothers have an average of about 2.7 years of education and fathers
have an average of 5.6 years.
In addition, we include several controls for the value of the cup, to address the fact
that girls may differ in how effective they find the cup relative to the alternative.8 These
include whether the girls works for pay (related to the need for mobility) and reported
time it takes to wash menstrual cloths (as a measure of how costly the alternative
technology is). We use a measure of cloth washing time collected during the baseline
survey; the figure is lower than what we see in the time diary, but the correlation
between measures is high. These variables are summarized in Panel B of Table 1.
Data on Cup Adoption. After the menstrual cups were distributed at the baseline
survey a nurse followed up with roughly monthly visits to the school, at which time
data were collected about cup usage. During the nurse visit, each girl in the treatment
group was asked if she had used the menstrual cup during her period that month.
argue that menstruation plays only a small role in school absence. That paper relates to a small literature
within economics on menstruation and work/school absence: Ichino and Moretti (2009) find evidence of
cyclicality in the absences of female Italian bank workers, which they attribute to menstruation, although
these conclusions have been questioned by Rockoff and Herrmann (2009).
8. The concept that individual differences in productivity could map into differences in technology
adoption references, of course, a large literature on the role of individual productivity differences in driving
adoption rates (e.g. Griliches 1957; Oster and Quigley 1977; Oster 1982; Caselli and Coleman 2001; David
1990; Luque 2002; Duflo et al 2005).
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FIGURE 2. Menstrual cup attempted usage, successful usage and failed attempts over time. This
figure shows evolution of usage of the menstrual cup, over time. Cups were distributed in November
or December of 2006. The labels indicate the number of individuals observed in each month. There
are a total of 101 treatment individuals.
Although verbal responses differ across girls, typical responses include quotes such as
“I use it and feel it is easy”, “I couldn’t insert so I haven’t used it” or “I am afraid to try
it”. From these responses we coded whether the girls attempted to use the menstrual
cup and whether they were successful. For example, the first quote here would be coded
as a successful usage attempt, the second quote would be coded as an unsuccessful
usage attempt and the third would be coded as not attempting to use.9
To give a sense of the basic patterns of adoption, Figure 2 shows the share of girls
attempting to use, the share who successfully used and the share who attempted but
failed to use in each month over the course of the study. The numbers above each
data point report the sample size in that month. Although the nurse affiliated with our
study made an effort to talk with each individual in each month, some girls were not
in school during the visits (no girls refused to talk to the nurse conditional on being in
school). On average, we observe 81% of girls in each month; we demonstrate there is
no differential rate of attendance by number of treatment friends in the next section.
For the most part, absences were isolated events and did not represent sample dropout.
Among the 68 girls for whom we miss any months of data, 42 are missing in only one
or two months and only 8 are sample dropouts.
9. Data on trial and usage were collected in an open-ended format since we thought it would elicit more
accurate responses from the girls. The nurse focused on getting this information consistently from each
girl she spoke with.
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Successful usage of the menstrual cup increased dramatically in the first six
months, from 10% in January 2007 to 60% in June 2007. After this, usage was fairly
constant, with little movement from June 2007 to January 2008. The pattern for trying
to use is similar, although the line is flatter. The share of girls attempting to use
increased from only 60% to 80% over the first months of the study and declined some
in the period after that. This decline reflects the fact that there is a decrease in girls
who continue to attempt without success. One thing that is important to note is that
once a girl used the cup once, continued usage was extremely high. After one month of
successful usage, girls used the cup in 91% of subsequent periods. Given this extremely
high continued usage rate, we will often refer to girls “adopting” the cup at the first
successful usage.
A central issue is whether girls’ reported cup usage accurately reflect their actual
usage. Although we have no direct observations of cup use, we have evidence of
high levels of cup usage using other features of the data. First, in the follow-up data,
girls were asked about their use of the cups as well as the use of pads or cloths.
Comparing the answers to questions on menstrual sanitary product use between girls
in the treatment group and control, in the baseline and at the follow-up surveys, we
find that treatment girls were 35 percentage points less likely to report using any cloths
than the control and they reported using on average 1.09 fewer cloths per period. There
were no significant differences in the reported use of pads between the treatment and
control girls. While this still relies on self-reported data, it provides some evidence of
the level of substitution between sanitary products.
A second piece of evidence on adoption comes from time-diary data collected
from the girls. For the first ten months of the project, we collected monthly time
diaries from each girl. Girls reported their activities for the first six days of each
month. Using these time diaries, we observe that girls in the control group spend
approximately 22 minutes more doing laundry on days when they are menstruating.
In contrast, treatment girls who are menstruating spend only an extra two minutes on
laundry relative to non-period days. This difference between treatment and control on
period days is significant (see Online Appendix Table 1). This internal consistency
supports the validity of our adoption data.
Data on Friendships. The object of interest when we consider effects of peers on
technology adoption will be the number of friends who also received the cup. We
generate this measure using data on friendships collected in the baseline survey. Before
the randomization took place, each of the girls was asked to list their three closest
friends who were also at the initial meeting.10 Our primary measure of friendships is
total friends, which includes everyone who the individual lists as a friend and anyone
10. In our survey we asked only about the three closest friends; we did not allow respondents to list all of
their possible friends. In practice, this truncation likely does not miss very many friends: in the follow-up
survey, we asked how many girls the respondent considered to be her close friend (without truncating the
total permissible friends) and 75% answered four or fewer, with a median number of three. In addition,
given the randomization, we are able to obtain an unbiased estimate of the impact of additional treatment
friends even if we do not observe all of an individual’s friends.
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who lists them as a friend. On average, girls listed 2.6 close friends with 68% listing
three friends and 25% listing two friends; when we add in people who list the girl a
as a friend, the average girl has 3.8 total friends, with a maximum of seven (Table 1,
Panel B). Consistent with the randomization, we see that an average of 50% of a girl’s
friends are in the treatment group (Table 1, Panel B). In addition to the total number
of friends, we also consider the strength of friendships, distinguishing between strong
friendships (bi-directional links) and weak friendships (uni-directional links).11
3. Peer Effects on Technology Adoption
This section presents our baseline estimates of the effect of peers on adoption of the
menstrual cup.
3.1. Empirical Strategy
Identifying causal effects of peers is challenging. The main concern, as outlined by
Manski (1993) relates to the issue of correlated unobservables: friends often have
similar characteristics, meaning that if we observe friends acting similarly, it is difficult
to separate whether they act similarly because they are influencing each other or
because they were ex-ante similar. Consider first the case without randomization in
which researchers have access to cross-sectional data including girls for whom they
observe menstrual product ownership/usage and friendships. It would certainly be
possible to run a regression to estimate the effect of friend ownership on product use in
this setting. However, it would not be correct to interpret these estimated coefficients
causally: if individual characteristics are correlated with friend characteristics, it is
likely that individuals who own the cup also have friends who own the cup not because
they are affected by their friends, but because they are similar to them. In our case, we
use the explicit randomization to identify causal peer effects. We outline this strategy
in detail in what follows.
Identifying Causal Peer Effects. As discussed in Section 2, at the baseline survey we
asked girls in our sample to list their friends. These friends are endogenously chosen
by the girls themselves and not randomly allocated. We randomly allocate ownership
of the menstrual cup across girls. Because randomization of the cup is at the individual
level, not only is individual ownership random, but which, and how many, of the
individual’s friends get the cup is also random. Consider a simple example of a girl
in the treatment group with two total friends. She faces a 50% chance that each of
her friends will also be in the treatment group. This means that there is a randomly
generated 25% chance she has no treatment friends, 50% chance of one treatment friend
11. It would also be possible, in principle, to separate weak friends into two groups by the direction
of who lists whom. In the analysis, when we make this distinction in the direction of listing, we find no
differences and therefore focus on the weak versus strong friendship type distinction only.
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and 25% chance of two treatment friends. Our analysis compares cup usage across
girls who have the same number of total friends, but—by chance—have a different
number of treatment friends. This randomization allows us estimate the causal effect
of the number of treatment friends (who own the cup) on cup adoption. The analyses
are run among only girls in the treatment group; however, the existence of the control
individuals (i.e. the randomization) is crucial to the identification, because it drives the
exogenous variation in number of treatment friends. As noted in the introduction, this
methodology is similar to that used in Miguel and Kremer (2007).
In our simplest analysis we compare cup usage rates across individuals who all
have the same number of total friends. Within each of these groups, the number
of friends who were assigned to the treatment group—and thus have access to the
cup—is determined randomly. Our regression analyses then estimate the impact of
number of treatment friends controlling for total number of friends. Our primary
results condition on a linear control for total number of friends. We also show (in
Online Appendix Table 3) results which control for dummy variables for total number
of friends and results which estimate the impact of the share of friends in the treatment
group. In all cases, we rely on the fact that number of treatment friends is randomly
allocated conditional on total number of friends which, by extension, means the share
of treatment friends is exogenous even unconditionally.
Estimating Equation. We begin by estimating the relationship between cup usage
and treatment friends at three different points in time (February 2007, August 2007,
and January 2008), which gives a sense of how the coefficients vary over time. In each
case, the variable for usage is equal to one if the individual reported successfully using
the cup in that month and zero otherwise. We estimate a probit model:
Pr(Usedi = 1) = (γ + δ1(Treatment Friendsi ) + Xi + μi ). (1)
Xi is a vector of controls (e.g., controls for total friends, age, grade, test scores, school
fixed effects, parental education, family income and measures of cup value), and
“Treatment Friendsi” is our measure of treatment friends (either number of treatment
friends or share). We report marginal effects from the probit model. Specifically, we
report the average of the marginal effects: for each variable we estimate the marginal
effect on usage for every individual and we take the average of those effects and that
is the reported coefficient. In practice, this is done by running a probit model and
using the “margeff” command in Stata (note that this is distinct from what is done
by the Stata “dprobit” command, which reports the marginal effect for the average
individual). Although these estimates are typically similar, in our setting the effects
from “dprobit” are the same in terms of significance but in most cases much larger
in magnitude. This appears to be due to the inclusion of school fixed effects. Since
we have two schools with very high levels of usage and two schools with very low
levels of usage, once we include school fixed effects in the regression we do have an
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“average” individual. The estimate of the marginal effect for the average individual is
therefore arbitrary (alternative specification results are available upon request).12
In addition to looking at the effects on usage at these three points in time we
undertake three additional analyses. First, we estimate a probit model measuring
whether an individual ever uses the cup during the entire time period. Second, we
estimate a simple linear model to estimate the effect of friends on the first month of
successful usage, conditional on ever using. Finally, we estimate a hazard model for
date of adoption; in that case, the unit of observation is an individual–month.
One important note is that we estimate the effect of friend ownership on cup
adoption, rather than friend usage. Because of the structure of the randomization,
ownership is what is determined randomly; friend usage may be correlated with
individual usage for all of the same reasons that correlated unobservables are a
problem without randomization. If ownership only mattered through usage, we could
instrument for usage with ownership. However, this assumes away other possible
ownership impacts (for example, girls could want to use less when friends own the
cup, if exposure makes people suspicious of the cup).
Balancing on Observables. The central assumption in our empirical strategy is that,
conditional on the total number of friends, the number of treatment friends is randomly
assigned. To test the validity of this randomization, we compare baseline characteristics
among girls with different numbers of treatment friends, conditional on their total
number of friends.13 We regress each baseline characteristic of interest on indicators
for number of treatment friends and number of total friends. Coefficients on the number
of treatment friends from these regressions are shown in Table 2. In most cases, these
coefficients are small and statistically insignificant, suggesting the randomization was
successful, at least in terms of observables. One exception is the variable indicating
whether a girl had ever worked for pay. Girls in our sample who have more treatment
friends are significantly more likely to work at baseline; this likely reflects our small
sample size and appears to have occurred by chance. We include this control in all
regressions which addresses this difference.14
12. We assume independence across girls, so do not cluster the standard errors. One concern is that there
may be correlation among girls in similar overall peer groups. In practice, the schools are small enough
such that in most cases all girls are linked in a single large peer group, so if we were to cluster it would
be more or less at the school level. This seems extreme. However, we have run models with this type of
clustering and, if anything, the standard errors are smaller (results available from the authors).
13. A separate issue is whether the treatment and control groups are balanced, which is not the central
issue for this analysis. However, a test for balancing in these groups (replicated from Oster and Thornton
2011) is presented in Online Appendix Table 2. These balancing tests are discussed in more detail in Oster
and Thornton (2011).
14. The length of time working, conditional on working at all, is balanced across number of treatment
friends, suggesting this lack of balance is not likely to be systematic. Moreover, there are no significant
differences in working between treatment and control girls, or differences in the likelihood that mothers
were working for pay, suggesting there was no targeting on girls who work (and who have more treatment
friends).
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TABLE 2. Balancing tests.
Coeff. on # of Treat. Friends (Std. Error)
Age 0.091 (0.095)
Seventh grade (0/1) 0.006 (0.039)
Test score last year −0.097 (0.090)
Father Hindu 0.054 (0.039)
Father Tharu or Tibetan −0.058 (0.038)
Income category −0.132 (0.121)
Mother’s yrs educ. −0.199 (0.306)
Father’s yrs educ. −0.178 (0.370)
Menses at baseline (0/1) −0.028 (0.026)
Work for pay 0.099 (0.031)∗∗∗
Days worked (if >0) 0.058 (0.324)
Time to wash cloths 3.38 (2.48)
# Months observed in sample 0.301 (0.237)
Notes: This table shows balancing tests by number of treatment friends. Total number of friends includes all
friends the individual lists, plus any people who list her as a friend. The omitted ethnicity category is Newari.
Income categories range from 1–6 (definitions in Table 1 notes).
∗∗∗ Significant at 1%.
3.2. Results: Peer Effects on Technology Adoption
We begin by showing our central results of the effects of the number of treatment friends
in graphical form. As noted in Table 1, the total number of friends that an individual has
(including friends the individual lists and friends who list the individual) ranges from
one to seven. The majority of individuals (60%) have either three or four total friends.
Focusing on these two groups, Figure 3(a) shows the usage probability during the first
three months of the sample, grouped by number of total friends. Within each group,
the number of treatment friends is experimentally generated by the randomization and
we can interpret differences in usage as a causal effect.
Figure 3(a) shows strong evidence of peer effects. Within either group, we see
cup usage increasing in the number of treatment friends. For example, among the
group with four total friends, there is no usage in the first three months for those with
zero treatment friends, and then usage increases as the number of treatment friends
increases, to as high as 100% for the (very small) sample of individuals who have four
treatment friends. Although the sample sizes are small here, the regression coefficients
reported (from simple regressions of usage on number of treatment friends) indicate
that the impact of number of treatment friends on usage is large and highly significant.
Figure 3(b) shows an identical graph, but focuses on usage in the last three months
of the study, rather than the first three. In this case, we see that the peer effects
have diminished—usage rates among those with no friends in the treatment group are
similar to usage for individuals with many friends. The regression results do indicate
some evidence of continued peer effects on individuals with four total friends, but no
evidence of peer effects in the three total friend group.
In Table 3 we provide statistical evidence on peer effects. In this case, we include
all individuals and control for number of total friends. Panel A includes only the
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FIGURE 3. These figures show usage by number of treatment friends, grouped by number of total
friends. (a) The average of usage in January, February, and March of 2007, the first three months of
the study. (b) The average of usage in November and December of 2007 and January 2008 (at the
end of the study). Regression coefficients are marginal effects from a probit regression of usage on
number of treatment friends within the sample with constant total number of friends.
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TABLE 3. Determinants of menstrual cup usage.
Used menstrual cup during:
Ever used First month Hazard model
Feb. 2007 Aug. 2007 Jan. 2008 mooncup used (1–10) for usage
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: School fixed effects and total number of friends control only
# Treat friends 0.1805∗∗∗ 0.0817∗ 0.0741 0.0782∗ −0.6026∗∗ 1.207∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.048) (0.047) (0.039) (0.244) (0.064)
# Friends −0.0815∗∗ −0.0614 −0.0057 −0.0520∗ −0.0450 0.9436
(0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.030) (0.204) (0.041)
Number of obs. 100 78 77 101 67 810
Panel B: With demographic controls
# Treat friends 0.1864∗∗∗ 0.0481 0.0326 0.0408 −0.6884∗∗∗ 1.221∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.049) (0.049) (0.042) (0.256) (0.073)
# Friends −0.0841∗∗ −0.071∗∗ −0.0136 −0.0489∗ −0.0135 0.9103∗∗
(0.031) (0.033) (0.032) (0.028) (0.208) (0.044)
Work for pay 0.3512∗∗ 0.4754∗∗ 0.4720∗∗∗ 0.2063 −1.5146∗ 2.019∗∗∗
(0.154) (0.103) (0.071) (0.188) (0.894) (0.455)
Days worked −0.0755∗∗ −0.1282∗∗ −0.1519∗∗∗ −0.0071 0.1431 0.879∗∗
(0.032) (0.048) (0.047) (0.072) (0.201) (0.048)
Time to wash 0.0026∗ 0.0048∗ 0.0043∗ 0.0033 −0.0077 1.001
cloths (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002)
Age 0.0382 0.0679∗ 0.0733 0.0598∗ −0.2929 1.094∗
(0.034) (0.040) (0.044) (0.032) (0.193) (0.057)
Grade 0.1529∗∗ −0.1547 −0.0528 −0.0838 −0.4358 0.857
(0.063) (0.099) (0.086) (0.077) (0.446) (0.095)
Father Tharu −0.2341∗∗ −0.1352 −0.2440∗∗ −0.1315 0.0724 0.788∗
or Tibetan (0.068) (0.107) (0.069) (0.090) (0.565) (0.111)
Father 0.1335 0.0018 −0.2375 −0.1802 −0.1599 1.036
Newari (0.183) (0.252) (0.230) (0.176) (1.333) (0.317)
School #2 −0.2967∗∗∗−0.2854∗∗ −0.2487∗∗ −0.2523∗∗ 2.0892∗∗∗ 0.5058∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.085) (0.093) (0.089) (0.578) (0.074)
School #3 −0.3645∗∗∗−0.4992∗∗∗ −0.4925∗∗∗ −0.4373∗∗∗ 2.2847∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.104) (0.111) (0.114) (0.749) (0.062)
School #4 −0.3922∗∗∗−0.5723∗∗∗ −0.6261∗∗∗ −0.5472∗∗∗ 2.965∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.071) (0.061) (0.088) (0.813) (0.045)
Exam score 0.0291 0.0598 −0.013 0.0155 −0.1519 1.039
(0.027) (0.050) (0.029) (0.029) (0.195) (0.046)
Mom educ. 0.0151 0.0311 0.0018 0.0234∗∗ −0.0409 1.058∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.020) (0.013) (0.011) (0.074) (0.021)
Dad educ. −0.0126 −0.0247 −0.0293∗ −0.0318∗∗ −0.0206 0.970∗
(0.010) (0.016) (0.015) (0.012) (0.071) (0.017)
Family income 0.0208 0.0458 0.0771∗∗ 0.0403 −0.4113∗∗ 1.088∗∗
(0.025) (0.036) (0.034) (0.028) (0.156) (0.042)
Number of obs. 96 74 73 97 65 772
Mean of dep. var. 0.29 0.55 0.64 0.66 3.22
Notes: This table shows the effect of peers on cup usage. The first three columns use one month of data each.
The fourth column estimates the effect of treatment friends on ever using the cup; the fifth column estimates peer
effects on first month of usage, conditional on ever using. The sixth column shows estimates from a hazard model
for usage; the coefficients reported are hazard ratios and the unit of observation is a person–month. Columns
(1)–(4) report marginal effects from a probit model; column (5) uses OLS and column (6) is a Cox proportional
hazard model. The mean of the dependent variable (reported at the bottom of the table) applies to both panels.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
∗Significant at 10%; ∗∗significant at 5%; ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
Oster and Thornton Peer Effects in Technology Adoption 1279
FIGURE 4. Estimated effect of treatment friends on menstrual cup usage, by month. This figure
shows coefficients on number of treatment friends from regressions run in each month. In all cases
the dependent variable is menstrual cup usage in that month. 95% confidence intervals are shown.
∗∗Significant at 5% level.
control for total number of friends and school fixed effects (since our randomization
was within school). Panel B reports results including additional controls. The first three
columns estimate the impact of treatment friends on adoption at three specific months:
February 2007 (two months after distribution), August 2007 and January 2008 (the
last month before the follow-up survey). Consistent with Figure 3(a), we find strong
evidence of peer effects in February 2007: one additional treatment friend increases
the chance of adoption by 18.1 percentage points (or 18.6 percentage points when we
look at Panel B). This effect dissipates in the later months, consistent with Figure 3(b):
by the end of the study, those with more treatment friends are not using at higher rates
than those with fewer treatment friends. Figure 4 explores the timing of these effects
in more detail (based on the regression with full controls) and shows that the effect
of peer exposure is large and significant in early months (through March 2007) and
positive but not significant in the later months.
Columns (4)–(6) of Panel A of Table 3 show additional estimates of the effects
of peers on adoption. In column (4) we find that having more treatment friends has
a weak impact on the chance of ever using successfully (and no impact when we
include controls). Columns (5) and (6) reinforce our finding that friends affect timing
of adoption. The dependent variable in column (5) is the first month that the girl used
the cup, if she ever used it. The evidence in this regression shows that each additional
treatment friend decreases time to adoption by 0.7 months.15 Column (6) shows that
this effect is also present when using a hazard model.
15. Recall that once an individuals use the cup once, 91% of them continue using it, so early usage leads
to earlier continual adoption in nearly all cases.
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The estimates in Panels A and B of Table 3 are very similar. Consistent with our
balanced randomization, including demographic controls does not have a large impact.
It also suggests that it is unlikely other unobservables would change our results (as
in Altonji, Elder, and Taber 2000). We also see some evidence that indicators of the
potential benefit of adopting the cup mattered in overall use. Girls who work for pay
and girls who take longer to wash their menstrual cloths at the baseline survey adopted
at higher rates. Time spent washing cloths, in particular, had long-lasting effects.
Variation in this variable is likely due to how heavy a girl’s period is.16 We find large
variation across schools in adoption, with highest adoption in schools 1 and 2 (96% of
girls ever using in school 1 and 84% in school 2) and lowest in schools 3 and 4 (44%
and 40%, respectively), but because of the small sample size of the number of schools,
it is not possible to attribute the lower or higher rates of adoption in the schools to one
particular factor.17
The Online Appendix Table 3 shows similar analyses with varying functional
forms (first controlling for dummies for number of total friends rather than a linear
control and, second, estimating the impact of share of friends with the cup). The results
with dummies are virtually identical and the evidence on shares shows the same pattern
(although the exact numbers are obviously different).18
Taken together, the evidence in Table 3 and Figures 3 and 4 suggest strong evidence
of peer effects. These seem to operate through encouraging earlier adoption of the cup:
those with more friends start using faster, although by the end of the study usage rates
are fairly similar.19
Effects by Friendship Type. Recall that we classify friendships into two categories:
strong friends (both girls list each other) and weak friends (only one individual lists
the other). The regressions in Table 4 replicate Panel B of Table 3, but report effects by
16. Particularly notable is the relationship, or lack thereof, between adoption and human capital. The
literature on technology adoption frequently cites levels of human capital as predictive of early adoption
(Oster and Quigley 1977; Caselli and Coleman 2001). While in our sample we do not have variation in
years of schooling we do have variation in baseline exam scores, an alternative measure of human capital.
Although the coefficients on this variable are positive, they are not consistently significant. Similarly,
parents’ education and income seem to have little effect on adoption, suggesting that socioeconomic status
does not play a role.
17. Maternal education is slightly lower at the high-adoption schools, and working is also slightly higher.
However, there is no trend in test scores, and there are no differences in the number of treatment friends or
share of friends in the treatment group. Further, these schools are all in the same area, so they would not
differ in cultural norms. Ultimately, without more schools it is impossible to attribute these differences to
one particular factor.
18. Online Appendix Figure 1 provides another visual representation of the data in which we
run regressions using all months in the sample and estimate the impact of dummy variables for
“treatment–friend–months”. This figure shows the same pattern: initial friend–months of exposure have
the largest impacts.
19. It is important to be clear on the interpretation of the declining peer effect over time. As time passes,
even girls with few or no close treatment friends learn to use the cup. They could, for example, learn from
the study nurse, or through friends of friends; our sample is too small to estimate these indirect impacts
of peers. The fact that we see fewer peer effects later in the study does not mean peers do not matter, but
suggests that as information diffuses broadly, everyone has enough “peers” to learn.
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TABLE 4. Influence of friend type on menstrual cup adoption.
Used menstrual cup during:
Ever First Hazard
Feb. Aug. Jan. used month model
2007 2007 2008 mooncup used (1–10) for usage
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Explanatory variables:
#Strong Treat. Fr. 0.2655∗∗∗ 0.1497∗ 0.3099∗∗ 0.1482∗ −0.8201∗∗ 1.289∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.093) (0.137) (0.089) (0.4040) (0.120)
#Weak Treat. Fr. 0.1421∗∗∗ −0.0004 −0.0016 −0.0018 −0.6040∗∗ 1.191∗∗
(0.048) (0.059) (0.049) (0.049) (0.305) (0.084)
Controls for # Fr. YES YES YES YES YES YES
Number of Obs. 96 74 73 97 65 772
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.29 0.55 0.64 0.66 3.22
Notes: This table shows the effect of peers on cup usage separated by friend type. The first three columns use one
month of data each. The fourth column estimates the effect of treatment friends on ever using the cup; the fifth
column estimates peer effects on first month of usage, conditional on ever using. The sixth column shows estimates
from a hazard model for usage; the coefficients reported are hazard ratios and the unit of observation is a person-
month. Strong friends are bidirectional—both individuals list the other—and weak friends are unidirectional.
Regressions include the controls from Table 3, including controls for number of friends. Standard errors are in
parentheses.
∗Significant at 10%; ∗∗significant at 5%; ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
friendship type. Other controls (those reported in Panel B of Table 3) are included but
not shown. We find that strong friendships are more important than weak friendships
in cup use. This is particularly true later in the study. The effect of weak friendships
falls off very quickly, but the effect of strong friendships persists.
4. Peer Effect Mechanisms: Wanting to Use or Success at Usage
The results in the previous section suggest that friend cup ownership matters for
adoption. However, thus far we have not made progress on the more fundamental
question of why or how friends matter for cup adoption. In this section we address
this question. It is important to note that although the results in this section use the
randomization, they also rely to a much greater extent on a more structural model of
behavior. For these reasons, the conclusions in this section should be taken with greater
caution than the basic peer effects estimates presented previously.
4.1. Outline and Graphical Evidence
Peer exposure may matter because peers affect whether an individual wants to use the
technology. This could occur either because of imitation (individuals want to act like
their friends) or because peers affect individual perceptions about technology value
(Miguel and Kremer 2007; Kohler, Behrman, and Watkins 2001). Peers could also
matter if people learn how to use the technology from their friends (Duflo and Saez
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2003; Munshi and Myaux 2006; Miguel and Kremer 2007). The existing literature
has generally been unable to separate these mechanisms. An exception is Miguel
and Kremer (2007), who estimate peer effects on adoption of deworming drugs
and explicitly distinguish between these avenues. They find negative peer effects—
individuals with more peers in early adopter schools are less likely to adopt—which
effectively rules out either imitation or learning about how to use the technology as
drivers, since both of those would produce positive effects. In our case, since we find
positive peer effects, we cannot rule out any of these possibilities.
To address the mechanisms, in this section we present a model and a set of results
which rely on the fact that we observe separate measures of successful and failed
usage attempts. We assume that there are two stages in determining the adoption of
a new technology: first, individuals decide whether or not they would like to use the
technology; second, they may or may not be successful at using the technology. We
posit that technology value affects whether an individual wants to use (first stage)
and knowledge about how to use affects success in using (second stage). Intuitively,
this implies that observing peer impacts on cup trial would indicate that peer exposure
impacts the value of the technology, and observing peer effects on cup usage conditional
on trial would indicate that peer exposure impacts how quickly girls learn how to use
the new technology.
Figures 5(a) and (b) present the simplest graphical analysis of this issue. These
figures echo Figure 3(a) in structure but focus on peer effects on usage conditional on
trial (Figure 5(a)) and peer effects on trial (Figure 5(b)). We focus on the first three
months due to the fact that peer effects occur only early in the sample; thus we do
not show analogs to Figure 3(b) (these are available from the authors). Focusing first
on Figure 5(a), we see strong evidence that peers impact successful usage conditional
on attempting to use the cup. This figure looks very similar to Figure 3(a), and the
regression estimates of the effects of additional treatment friends on successful usage
are highly significant. We observe point estimates of 0.128 (s.e. 0.062) among those
with three total friends and 0.193 (s.e. 0.056) among those with four total friends.
This points towards an impact of peers on learning how to use the cup. In Figure 5(b),
we also see some evidence that peers impact attempting to use the cup, although
these results are weaker and less significant (point estimates of 0.079 (s.e. 0.053)
among those with three friends and 0.121 (s.e. 0.051) among those with four friends).
Taken at face value, these graphs suggest that peers may matter for both successful
usage and wanting to use, although they seem to be more important for successful
usage.
Although these graphs are suggestive, there are two central issues to be addressed
which relate to the interplay between the two outcomes of interest. First, we are only
able to observe successful usage among girls who actually attempt to use. This means
our estimates of peer impacts on learning to use are valid only for a select sample
of girls. If the peer effects on usage success were to be different for the sample of
girls who do not try, this affects the generalizablity of our results. This is unlikely
to be a significant issue, for several reasons. Most obviously, this is not a problem if
wanting to use the cup is unrelated to the impact of peers on successful use. This does
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FIGURE 5. (a) Usage by number of treatment friends, grouped by number of total friends, conditional
on trying to use the cup. This figure reports the average of usage in January, February, and March of
2007, the first three months of the study. Regression coefficients are marginal effects from a probit
regression of usage on number of treatment friends within the sample with either three total friends
or four total friends. (b) Cup trial by number of treatment friends, grouped by number of total friends.
This figure reports the average of cup trial in January, February, and March of 2007, the first three
months of the study. Regression coefficients are marginal effects from a probit regression of usage
on number of treatment friends within the sample with either three or four total friends.
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not seem like an unreasonable assumption. Second, even if the OLS estimates are not
valid for the entire sample, they are valid for the group that is relevant, namely those
who actually want to use the product. Put differently, although these estimates may
not directly reflect the relevant parameter in the model, they do reflect the parameters
which we would observe in the world. As we will see in what follows, our ultimate
conclusions about the impact of peers on ability to use the cup echo very strongly the
evidence in Figure 5(a).
A second, and much more important issue is that the decision to try to use is
very likely to be affected by expectations of success: if a girl knows she will not be
successful, she is unlikely to try. Given this, if there are peer impacts on usage success,
this may mechanically translate into peer impacts on attempting to use. Below, we
develop a simple model of this decision which makes these issues clear and we suggest
an estimation strategy to address these concerns.
4.2. Two-Stage Process of Technology Adoption
As previously, assume there are two stages in determining the adoption of a new
technology. We denote the overall probability of usage as pu, the probability that an
individual wants to use as pw and the probability of success at using as ps. These are
all functions of friendships and of observables. In particular, denote f i as the number
of treatment friend exposures to the cup (i.e. total months of exposure), and xi as a
vector of controls, which includes demographics, total numbers of friends and months
since distribution. In addition, denote vi as the value of the cup. Overall probability of
usage can be written as
pu( fi , xi , vi ) = pw( fi , xi , vi )ps( fi , xi , vi ). (2)
Thus far, we have established a positive relationship between friend exposure and
overall use of the cup: dpu/df i > 0. This is consistent with either dpw/df i > 0 or
dps/df i > 0, or both. In this framework, we propose that dps/df i > 0 indicates that
friends matter because they help individuals learn about how to use the cup and that
dpw/df i > 0 indicates that friends matter because they affect cup value (either through
imitation or through learning about value of the cup). In our data we observe whether or
not someone attempts to use, and whether she is successful conditional on attempting.
These decisions map into pw and ps in the theoretical framework, in ways detailed
below.
Attempt to Use. We assume that attempting usage of the cup has a cost, which
we denote εi ∼ H(.) and which is paid regardless of whether or not the attempt is
successful. There is no additional cost of using after the attempt.20 An individual will
20. We argue this is a reasonable assumption, since most of the difficult and uncomfortable aspects of
using the cup involve trying to insert it. In this setting, the cup was free. In the case of other technologies
or other settings there may be opportunity costs of adoption, or other costs that might be important in the
decision to try to adopt.
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attempt to use the cup if the benefits exceed the cost. Denote the benefit of the cup for
individual i as Bi. These benefits are experienced only if the girl is able to successfully
use the cup; in contrast, the costs are paid at the time of the attempt. This means
that the girl will be more likely to try if she feels she is more likely to be successful,
since her benefits are effectively adjusted by her probability of success. Denoting the
expected probability of success as E[ps(f i, xi, vi)] a girl will attempt to use the cup if
the following holds:
Bi E[ps( fi , xi , vi )] > εi . (3)
We can rescale the benefits and costs to be in terms of probabilities, so the benefits are
reflected in pw(f i, xi, vi). Denote the rescaled cost as ε̂i . We can then rewrite equation
(3) in terms of the scaled probabilities
pw( fi , xi , vi )E[ps( fi , xi , vi )] > ε̂i . (4)
Success at Usage. In the data we observe whether or not a girl is successful at using
the cup conditional on having attempted. Formally, we observe ps(f i, xi, vi) conditional
on equation (4) holding.
Because of these interdependencies—that we observe wanting to use only adjusted
by probability of success, and success only conditional on equation (3) holding—
actually estimating dps/df i and dpw/df i is empirically challenging. In the next sections,
we outline how we use the data to identify these peer effects.
In moving from the theory to the data, we make one important and central
assumption: once an individual decides to try the cup, there is no effort margin
on trying, and success is simply determined by factors fixed at that point (in
particular, friend exposure and demographics). Formally, this amounts to assuming
that dps/dvi = 0. That is, we assume that the probability that an individual is able to
successfully use the cup does not depend on cup value (either actual or perceived).
Probability of success is a function only of the knowledge about how to use the cup
(derived from friends) and, possibly, individual demographic characteristics. Given
this assumption, moving forward we will refer to ps as a function only of f i and
xi: ps(f i, xi). A related assumption is that the cost of trying, ε̂i , is not a function of
peers.
This is a crucial assumption because it is necessary for us to interpret the reports
from participants about cup trial and usage as reflecting the elements of the model.
Without this assumption, our two-stage process effectively collapses into a single
decision about wanting to use, in which success at usage simply reflects how much
the person wants to use, and how hard they are willing to try. In that case, “trial” and
“usage” would simply reflect different intensities of desired usage and it would not
make sense to think about a two-stage model. Ultimately, we feel that this assumption
is reasonable, but it is important to keep in mind, given the role that it plays in our
estimation of these mechanisms. If this assumption is not valid, we effectively lose our
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ability to interpret cup “trial” and “usage” as separate events, and our analysis of the
data could not be informative about mechanisms.
4.3. Peer Effects on Successful Usage
Estimation Strategy. We work backward and begin by first analyzing the second stage
of the adoption process: successful usage. We observe ps(f i, xi) directly in the data: it
is successful usage conditional on attempting to use (shown in Figure 5(a)). However,
we observe this only for individuals who attempt to use at all. We do not observe
the probability of success among those who do not choose to try. This introduces a
potential selection problem which was discussed briefly earlier. More specifically, girls
who want to use more, or who have lower costs of attempting to use, will be more
likely to try the cup. If peer effects on successful usage are different for these girls than
for those who do not want to try, then simple OLS estimates will be valid only for this
selected sample of girls.
We first estimate dps/df i with an OLS regression of cup usage on friend exposure,
restricting the sample to girls who have tried the cup. These estimates are valid for
the relevant sample of girls who try to use the cup. Further, these estimates will be
valid for the whole sample if the selection issues are small. In addition, as a robustness
strategy to address the selection issue directly, we estimate the same regression using
a Heckman selection model.
Running this selection model requires us to identify some variable which influences
trial but does not influence knowledge of how to use.21 In our case we use month-
on-month variations in whether a girl has her period since girls typically do not try
to use the cup if they do not have their period. This variation is driven primarily by
the fact that menstrual cycles are not regular during early years of menstruation (for
a discussion of menstrual cycle length among adolescents, see American Academy of
Pediatrics 2006). In our data, 15 treatment girls miss their period at least once during
the study and 11 of these miss in just one month. We believe that missed periods at
this age (more accurately, long cycle lengths) are unlikely to be otherwise correlated
with ability to use the cup. Not having one’s period is a very good predictor of not
trying the cup, but some girls do report trying to use in months they do not have their
period, perhaps for practice. It seems at least plausible that these girls are the ones
who are most interested in using the cup. For both of these reasons, this provides an
appropriate selection criterion.
21. Note that the selection model is only as good as the selection variable. An example of a common use
of the Heckman selection framework is in estimating the returns to schooling for women. Many women
are out of the labor force, so estimating returns to schooling only for women who are in the labor force
will yield estimates which are only valid for that selected sample. A common selection instrument in this
case is the presence of young children: women who have young children are less likely to be in the labor
force but (by assumption) do not have a different wages other than for this reason. As in this case, we are
looking for a selection variable which influences the desire to try the cup, or the ability to try, but does not
influence ability to use.
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TABLE 5. Peer effects on successful usage.
Dependent variable: used menstrual cup
OLS: used Heckman selection
condition on trial Selection: no period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Entire First Later Entire First Later
sample 5 months 5 months sample 5 months 5 months
Explanatory variables:
#Treat. fr. months 0.0138∗∗∗ 0.0298∗∗ 0.0120∗∗ 0.0131∗∗∗ 0.0307∗∗∗ 0.0119∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.011) (0.005) (0.004) (0.011) (0.004)
#Friend months −0.0079∗ −0.0143 −0.0075∗ −0.0073∗ −0.0148∗ −0.0072∗
(0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Number of obs. 562 297 265 772 416 356
Mean of dep. var. 0.68 0.58 .79 0.49 0.41 0.59
Notes: This table shows the estimates of the effect of peers on success at menstrual cup usage. The first three
columns estimate OLS regression of usage conditional on trial. Columns (4)–(6) estimate Heckman selection
models, where the selection is on whether or not the individual tried, and the selector variable is “no period this
month”. Controls for demographics are included in all columns (the same controls as in Table 3, minus controls
for benefits). Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by individual.
∗Significant at 10%; ∗∗significant at 5%; ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
Results. Figure 5(a) showed a portion of our OLS results visually, and suggested
that without any selection adjustment the impact of peers on usage success was
large and statistically significant. Table 5 estimates these impacts statistically.
We use individual–month observations and estimate the effect of number of
treatment–friend–months of exposure. Columns (1)–(3) present the OLS estimates and
columns (4)–(6) present corresponding Heckman selection estimates.22 Both the OLS
and Heckman models give extremely similar results. This suggests that the selection
issues raised previously are not very salient in practice. Overall, having more exposure
to treatment friends is strongly correlated with successful usage of the cup. This is
especially true during early months (columns (2) and (5)), although the effect remains
significant in later months (columns (3) and (6)).
The evidence in Table 5 suggests that peer exposure to this technology affects
the ability to use the cup successfully. This suggests that peers matter for adoption
because people learn from others about how to use. The estimates are largest in early
months after distribution, which is consistent with our overall finding that peer effects
are larger early on.
We next move to the first stage of the adoption process, when individuals decide
whether they want to use the cup.
22. The first-stage regressions for the Heckman selection model are shown in Online Appendix Table 4.
In the whole sample period (column (4)), the excluded selection variable of not having a period that month
has a z-statistic of 5.28 and a marginal effect of –0.72.
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4.4. Peer Effects on Trial (Wanting to Use)
Estimation Strategy. When making the decision to try the cup, the expected
probability of success of trial is an important factor (equation (4)). As noted in
Section 4.1, we cannot simply estimate the effect of friends on usage attempts and
interpret them as an effect of wanting to use. This is especially true since we find in
Section 4.3 that friends matter for successful usage. Given this, observing that friends
matter for attempting to use might well reflect only their effect on expected usage
success, not effects on wanting to use. In contrast to the selection concerns discussed
previously, this is likely to be a significant concern since we know from the evidence
that friends do impact success at usage.
In order to identify the causal effects of peers on wanting to use the cup (dpw/df i),
we would ideally like some exogenous variation that affects the expected probability
of success, E[ps(f i, xi)]. Unfortunately, in this case, we have no obvious candidate for
this in our data limiting our ability to identify (dpw/df i). However, we argue that we
can use the structure of the model to estimate this parameter.
Recall equation (2),
pu( fi , xi , vi ) = pw( fi , xi , vi )ps( fi , xi ).
Differentiating this equation with respect to f i yields the following expression:
dpu
d fi
= pw( fi , xi , vi )dps
d fi
+ ps( fi , xi )dpw
d fi
.






− pw( fi , xi , vi ) dpsd fi
ps( fi , xi )
. (5)
Several of these values have been estimated thus far in the analysis. We estimated
dpu/df i, the effect of friend exposure on overall adoption, in Table 3. In Section 4.3
(Table 5) we estimated dps/df i, the effect of friend exposure on the probability of a
successful trial. The object pw(f i, xi, vi) is the probability that an individual wants to use
the cup overall; based on equation (4) we note that this is the probability of attempting
to use conditional on expecting to be successful for sure. We do not observe this directly
in the data, since we only observe attempts at usage as determined by equation (4).
However, by the end of the study, most girls who try are successful; we can infer
from this that expected success (E[ps(f i, xi)]) should be close to 100%. Using this later
part of the sample, we predict the probability of attempting to use for each girl in the
sample, and define this as her pw. Put simply, this is the probability of wanting to use
when E[ps( fi , xi )]  1. In the Online Appendix we will also provide estimates where
we assume everyone wants to use (pw = 1).
The object ps(f i, xi) is the probability of success, on average, for all individuals,
including those who do not attempt to use. We can estimate this based on the results in
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TABLE 6. Peer effects on wanting to use menstrual cup.
OLS (naive regressions) Willingness to
Dependent var.: tried pay Dep. var:
menstrual cup Structural estimates Wtp, Rs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Entire First Later Entire First Later
sample 5 months 5 months sample 5 months 5 months
Explanatory variables:
#Treat. fr. 0.0066 0.0371∗∗∗ 0.0038 0.004 0.0144 0.0020
months (0.005) (0.014) (0.005) (0.006) (0.026) (0.005)
#Treatment 188.39
friends (126.77)
Controls YES YES YES N/A N/A N/A YES
Number of obs. 772 264 508 772 264 508 67
Mean of dep. var. 0.72 0.66 0.75 0.72 0.66 0.75 1589
Notes: This table shows estimates of the effect of peers on wanting to use the cup. The first three columns show
baseline effects of these variables on trial; the coefficient should not be interpreted as effects on wanting to use.
Columns (4)–(6) provide estimates of friend effects on wanting to use based on structural assumptions in the
model (standard errors are bootstrapped). Column (7) estimates effects on reported willingness to pay for the cup
at follow-up. Controls for demographics are included in columns (1)–(3) and (7) (the same controls as in Table 3).
In the case of the structural estimates the controls are incorporated when we estimate the parameters that go into
the structural estimation. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by individual when appropriate.
∗∗∗Significant at 1%.
Section 4.3. Specifically, we run the regressions from Table 5 and use them to predict
ps for each individual. Given these four parameter estimates, we can calculate dpw/df i
for each individual and take the average across individuals; we generate bootstrapped
standard errors.23 It is important to note that, even more than the analysis in Section 4.3,
these results require significant assumptions about these parameters, and a heavy
reliance on the structure of the model. They should be taken with more caution.
Results. We begin by estimating OLS regressions of the impact of friendships on cup
trial, which echo Figure 5(b). Consistent with the previous discussion, finding an effect
of friends on trial in these naive regressions could reflect friends impacting wanting
to use (pw) or could reflect friends impacting success at usage (ps) and individual trial
responding to their probability of usage success.
Columns (1)–(3) of Table 6 estimate these OLS regressions (regressions are
estimated on observations stacked at the individual–month level, as in Table 5). The
coefficient on number of treatment friend exposures in column (1) is positive although
not statistically significant. In early months, however, there is a relatively strong
positive relationship between treatment friend exposures and attempts to use (column
(2)), which is also what we observed in Figure 5(b).
23. We could also have taken the average pw and average ps and used these to calculate the average
(dpw/df i); this gives the same solution as calculating for each individual and averaging.
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Columns (4)–(6) of Table 6 show results from our structural estimation of
(dpw/df i).24 The estimated effects of treatment friend exposure in this case are smaller
in magnitude, and never significant. The fact that the difference between the naive
estimates and the structural estimates is largest in early months may correspond to
evidence in Table 5, where we find that friends matter most for success at usage during
early months of the study. As a robustness check, Online Appendix Table 5 shows
similar estimates, but with the assumption that pw = 1. These coefficients are even
smaller and similarly insignificant. Note that these estimates are fairly noisy and, while
we come close, we cannot reject that the coefficient in column (1) of Panel B of Table 6
is as large as that in column (1) of Table 5. This gives yet another note of caution to
these results.
Willingness to Pay. In addition to the structural approach of estimating how peers
affect wanting to use the cup, we take advantage of a question in the follow-up survey
asking each girl: “Would you be willing to pay X for the menstrual cup?”, with X
ranging from 500 to 2500 Nepali Rupees (US$7 and US$33, respectively). We code
girls as willing to pay 500Rs if they say yes when X = 500Rs; willing to pay 1000Rs if
they say yes when X = 1000Rs, and so on up to 2500Rs. The average of this variable
is 1380Rs, which is about US$18. Note that these values are quite high and very likely
higher than we would see if these questions were not hypothetical. Nevertheless, we
feel that this variable indicates to some extent how much an individual may value
the cup. We focus on girls who have ever used the cup, since we expect them to
have E[ps( fi , xi )]  1 and estimate whether those with more friends have greater
willingness to pay.
Column (7) of Table 6 presents the results. The coefficient is relatively small
relative to the variable mean. One additional treatment friend increases willingness
to pay by an insignificant 188Rs, or about 12% of the mean. This suggests that once
we hold constant the ability to use the cup, friends do not affect cup value and, by
extension, do not affect wanting to use, consistent with the previous results.25
In summary, the evidence presented in this section most strongly supports the
claim that friends matter in girls ability to use the cup, rather than wanting to use
the cup. We can see this in simple graphs (Figure 5(a)), as well as in regressions.
Although selection concerns could drive our results, we argue they are unlikely to do
so in theory, and they do not in practice. In addition, in many ways the only relevant
group to estimate these parameters on are those girls who are willing to try. Given this,
the simple graphs and OLS regressions exactly capture the parameters of interest. In
24. We do not report coefficients on controls here, since the estimates are generated based on
running several regressions and calculating a nonlinear combination of coefficients; standard errors are
bootstrapped. In this sense there are no “controls” to report, even though they are included in the regressions
that generate this estimate.
25. An interesting related question is whether treatment friends impact willingness to pay among control
girls. We might expect this to be the case despite the evidence in column (7), since control girls with more
treatment friends may have a better sense of how to use the cup, and be more optimistic about their own
usage. In practice, a regression of the form in column (7) limited to control girls shows similar coefficients
(147 versus 188) and the estimate is not significant (available from the author).
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contrast, we find less evidence that peers matter for wanting to use. Although naive
regressions suggest some impact early on, these analyses suffer from the fact that girls
who know they will be successful are more likely to try. Once we attempt to adjust for
this, we find little or no impact of peers on friend cup trial.
5. Conclusion
This paper analyzes peer effects in the adoption of a new technology using data from
a randomized evaluation of menstrual cup provision in Nepal. Although menstrual
cups may be a relatively minor technology, we argue that the data and setting have a
number of advantages for this analysis. First, the menstrual cup is completely new and
unfamiliar, and it is somewhat difficult to use and requires learning, features shared
with other important technologies (contraceptives in particular). Second, because we
randomize at the individual level, we have exogenous variation in peer exposure,
which allows us to causally estimate peer effects on adoption. Third, our data contain
rich information on both trial and usage of the cup allowing us to make progress on
separating out mechanisms by which peers affect adoption.
We find strong evidence that peer exposure to the cup drives adoption. Girls
with more treatment friends adopt the cup more quickly. Our analysis of mechanisms
suggests that peers are most important for individuals to learning about how to use the
product, rather than influencing individuals wanting to use the product.
The results here may have policy implications which go beyond the particular
case of the menstrual cup. In many cases policymakers face choices about how best to
distribute technologies in order to maximize adoption. The results here indicate that the
appropriate targeting is likely to depend on specific characteristics of the product—in
particular, how much variation there is in the likelihood of success—which could be a
function of underlying abilities or in the difficulty of learning the technology.
We also believe that the findings in this paper may guide methodology. First, peer
effects are more important in early months after product distribution, suggesting that
there is value in observing adoption over time. Had we observed cup usage only at the
follow-up survey we would have missed these effects. This may also reflect the fact
that all individuals in the sample eventually learn how to use the product. Second, the
discussion of mechanisms here suggests that more data on patterns of adoption—in
particular, collecting more information about the way that individuals are deciding
whether or not to adopt—may be valuable in understanding the mechanisms through
which these effects operate.
Supporting Information
Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this article:
Online Appendix Table 1. Impacts of Menstrual Cup on Time Use (Laundry).
Online Appendix Table 2. Treatment Versus Control Balancing Tests (Replicated
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Online Appendix Table 5. Robustness for Table 6.
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